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Evening The Odds In Defamation- Troman v. Wood
WAYNE B. GIAMPIETRO*
From the inception of this country the law of defamation had
developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.' Only infrequently did the federal courts become involved in defamation cases
other than those which were heard pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.2
Suddenly, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the United States
Supreme Court discovered that the first amendment to the United
States Constitution limited defamation law as it had been developed by the states. The Court there fashioned a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.'
Having entered the field, the Court found that it had spawned
more questions than it had clarified. The Court was called upon
again and again to clarify issues arising from the seminal New York
Times ruling. Its struggle to answer these questions seemed destined
to culminate in complete federalization of the law of defamation, at
least insofar as it applied to the news and broadcast media. Thus,
the New York Times rule was extended to "public figures," i.e.,
persons who, either as a result of their status, or their activities, had
thrust themselves into the vortex of public discussion and were,
therefore, subject to open criticism of their actions and attitudes.2
The states followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court
in the defamation area. The Illinois Supreme Court, in fact, presaged the next ruling rendered by the Supreme Court. In Farnsworth
v. Tribune Company,6 a physician sued defendant newspaper for a
series of articles accusing her of being a "quack." Relying upon the
* Partner in the law firm of Ligtenberg, De Jong, Poltrock and Giampietro, Chicago,
Illinois; B.A., 1963, Purdue University; J.D., 1966, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
2. One example of federal entry into the field is Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931),
where it was held that free speech could not be subjected to prior restraint.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Id. at 279-80.
5. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
6. 43 I1. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
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Supreme Court decisions of New York Times and Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts,' the Illinois Supreme Court held that it was not the
status of the plaintiff which triggered the applicability of the constitutional rules, but rather whether a public issue was involved. If the
subject of the article under attack was of sufficient public interest,
the notoriety of the plaintiff was immaterial
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Farnsworthresult in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,9 a plurality opinion by a
severely divided Court, which extended the New York Times rule
to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or
general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are
famous or anonymous.' 0 This conclusion was based upon the rationale that "we are all 'public' men to some degree.""
Within a short time, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices
recognized, for the first time, in Gertz v. Welch," that "private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery."'"
Perhaps weary of deciding close questions fraught with first amendment implications in this area; the Court merely provided the outer
parameters of first amendment protection afforded defendants:
. . . so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the states
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for

a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual.
The Court went on to hold that "the states may not permit recovery
of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not
based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth."' 5
In Gertz, the United States.Supreme Court returned to the individual states responsibility for:decisions which it had for a time preempted to itself. In Troman v. Wood," the Illinois Supreme Court
responded to that delegation of authority and set forth rules applicable to defamation actions between private individuals and the
media.
7. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
8. Id. at 290-92, 253 N.E.2d at 411-12.
9. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 48.
12. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
13. Id. at 345-46.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 348-49.
16. 62 Il1. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
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Plaintiff in Troman filed suit as a result of a newspaper article
which appeared in the Chicago Sun Times. This article contained
a photograph which implied that plaintiff's home was the headquarters of a youth gang on the north side of Chicago which had been
implicated in various criminal activities in the neighborhood.
The trial court, in an unreported opinion, dismissed the case. 7
While recognizing that the Supreme Court in Gertz had relegated
to the states the determination of the standard of liability in cases
involving private citizens, the trial court ruled .that plaintiff was
required to plead and prove actual malice-the New York Times
standard. The court noted that Farnsworthhad been decided prior
to Rosenbloom, and was still persuasive authority in Illinois. The
court went further, however, deciding that the actual malice standard served both the objective of redressing untrue facts and the
objective of fulfilling the community's right to a free exchange of
matters of general public interest. The court also noted that negligence seemed an inappropriate standard for the intentional tort of
libel."
The Illinois Supreme Court, on direct appeal, reversed, holding
that in a suit brought by a private individual to recover actual
damages for a defamatory publication whose substantial harm to
reputation is apparent,
recovery may be had upon proof that the publication was false, and
that the defendant either knew it to be false, or, believing it to be
true, lacked reasonable grounds for that belief. We further hold
that negligence may form the basis of liability regardless of
whether or not the publication in question related to a matter of
public or general interest. Our holding in the present case is, of
course, not intended to remove any of the absolute or qualified
privileges which have heretofore been recognized in this State to
the extent that the facts may warrant their application. 9
The court reasoned that the actual malice standard was not justified by overriding Illinois public policy, stating that "prior to New
York Times it was not considered that liability for defamation required any showing of fault at all, let alone proof of actual malice. "2
The Troman court also found support for its decision in the Illinois Constitution. The court emphasized provisions concerning the
recognized interest of an individual in his reputation and stated:
17.
18.
19.
20.

Troman v. Wood, No. 74 L 13839, Circuit Court of Cook County (Feb. 7, 1975).

Id.
62 I1. 2d 184, at 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, at 299 (1975).
Id. at 194, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
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Moreover, the constitutions of this State have from the outset
recognized as fundamental the rights of "enjoying and defending
life and liberty, and acquiring, possessing and protecting property
and reputation." (Const. of 1818, art. VIII, sec. 1.) From the outset
it has been recognized that an individual is entitled to a remedy
"for all injuries and wrongs that he may receive in his person,
property or character." (Const. of 1818, art. VIII, sec. 12; Const.
of 1848, art. XIII, sec. 12.) (In the most recent constitutions the
word "reputation" is substituted for "character". (Const. of 1870,
art. II, sec. 19; Const. of 1970, art. I, sec. 12.) The freedom of
speech provisions of both our former and present constitutions
(Const. of 1870, art. II, sec. 4; Const. of 1970, art. I, sec. 4) recognize the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for they provide that the exercise of the right to speak freely
shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of
that right."
The court recognized that the individual has an interest in preserving and restoring his reputation through an authoritative
determination. "To foreclose or restrict the availability of the judicial process as a means of securing such a determination prevents
the individual from obtaining the effective vindication to which he
is entitled."
Rejecting the reasoning which it had used in Farnsworth, the
court criticized the use of "matters of public interest" as a criteria
for determining the scope of protection to be afforded a defamation
defendant. It determined that the use of such a standard would to
a great extent allow a potential defendant to create its own immunity, since "whether a matter is one of public interest, moreover,
depends to some degree on whether the media themselves have
chosen to make it one. 2 3 Recognition was also accorded to the possibility that an article dealing with a matter of public interest might
include a patently defamatory statement which was not, in and of
itself, an item of public interest. In such a situation, "[a] court
would then find itself enmeshed in difficult attempts to determine
whether the defamatory statement was germane to the main thrust
2' 4
of the article.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected alternative standards
of liability suggested by defendants. Gross negligence or wilful and
wanton misconduct was rejected on the ground that the already
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

194-95, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
195, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
196, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
196, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
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complex law of defamation "would not profit by the introduction of
a distinction based upon differing degrees of fault."2" The standard
of "journalistic malpractice" was rejected on the ground that such
would allow the newspapers in the community to establish their own
standards of care, which would tend toward a progressive depreciation of the standard of care used.2"
The Illinois Supreme Court has sought to reconcile the interests
of private citizens in the protection of their right of privacy, with
the interest of the press to inform the public of matters upon which
it has the right to be informed. The balance struck here is not unfair
to the press. As a result of the development of the law of defamation
within the past few years, the press has obtained a great deal of
protection which it did not previously possess. It still has all the
common law privileges which it always had, e.g., absolute privilege
to print official proceedings and qualified privilege of fair comment
and criticism. The burden of proving the truth or falsity of the
factual material has been shifted from defendant to plaintiff." The
plaintiff will be entitled to obtain only actual damages upon the
showing of mere negligence; if he desires to obtain punitive damages, he must now show actual malice in the New York Times

sense. 28
The standard of probable cause to believe that the material
printed is true, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court, is a standard
familiar to the courts. It is identical to that standard applied to
searches and seizures under both the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Illinois
Constitution. Under this standard, a defendant need not prove the
absolute truth of the material which he has printed, but only that
he had some reasonable ground for believing it to be true, such as
that it was obtained from a trustworthy source. Furthermore, the
burden of proving that defendant lacked reasonable grounds for
believing the information to be true is placed upon plaintiff.
The result of these developments in the law of defamation, as
culminated in the Troman decision, is to remove the absolutes in
the relationship between the private individual and the press, insofar as defamation is concerned. In effect, all defamation suits
brought against the press in Illinois are governed by the common
25. Id. at 197, 340 N.E.2d at 298. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to
adopt the standard of comparative negligence in personal injury cases. Maki v. Frelk, 40 I1.
2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
26. 62 II. 2d at 197-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
27. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
28. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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rules applicable to that group of libels previously known as libel per
quod. As in that situation, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
actual fault and actual damage.
Of course, in this case as in all seminal decisions, questions remain that will undoubtedly spawn further litigation. In speaking of
the kinds of words for which defendants would be liable in the
future, the court used the phrase "publication whose substantial
danger to reputation is apparent." 9 What, if anything, does this
presage in regard to the categories of statements traditionally held
to be defamatory per se? Perhaps no change was contemplated, for
the court specifically referred to "defamatory" publications. Certainly a review of the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions in libel and
slander actions throughout the years would indicate no tendency to
drastically rewrite the law of defamation, except where mandated
by United States Supreme Court decisions.
Another issue, bound to arise in the future, is referred to, but not
decided in the Troman opinion: what is the result where a newspaper does conduct an investigation into a fact situation and discovers
disagreement regarding the facts? Does the fact of such an investigation insulate the defendant from liability? Is a newspaper reporter
entitled to believe information given to him by an informant, or
must he also vouch for the credibility of such an informant? Stated
alternatively, what type of verification, if any, must a newspaper
reporter obtain before relying upon an informant's tip in writing a
story? The Illinois Supreme Court merely expressed its confidence
in the ability of the trial judge to frame suitable instructions which
would prevent the jury from confusing the issues of truth or falsity
of the information with the adequacy of the defendant's investigation .
Finally, with Troman, the Illinois Supreme Court has joined a
slight majority of the states which have decided the issue since
Gertz. Kansas, 3' Massachusetts 3 and Ohio 33 courts have set forth a
negligence standard essentially similar to that announced in
Troman. Indiana 34 and Colorado, 35 on the other hand, have opted for
29. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.
2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975).
30. Id. at 197, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
31. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
32. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975).
33. Thomas H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d
494 (1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S. L.W. 3198 (Oct. 7, 1975).
34. AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974).
35. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975), cert. denied sub
nor., Woestendiek v. Walker, 44 U.S. L.W. 3342 (Dec. 9, 1975).
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the actual malice standard of New York Times for cases dealing
with matters of public interest, although it should be noted that the
decision of the Indiana court was based upon the Indiana Constitution. New York has adopted yet a third approach, allowing recovery
only upon a showing of "grossly irresponsible" actions on the part
of defendant."
Troman's requirement that the press act responsibly and carefully is not unduly harsh; to hold otherwise would be to strip citizens
of their right to privacy. An individual who lives remote from the
public light has no recourse other than through the courts to clear
his name. Unlike a public official or public figure, he has no access
to the news media wherein he can rebut defamatory statements
made against him. A good reputation, fragile as well as valuable,
may be destroyed in an instant by a thoughtless word or comment
broadcast to the public. A rumor, once begun, is often impossible
to inhibit, manifesting effects all-pervasive and often indelibly imprinted upon public awareness. Some reasonable means of redress
is therefore mandated. The Illinois Supreme Court has provided this
means through the adoption of a negligence standard in defamation
cases involving private individuals defamed by the news or broadcast media.
36.

Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975).

